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Summary
Safety in aviation has often been compared with safety in
healthcare. Following a recent article in this journal, the UK
government set up an Independent Patient Safety
Investigation Service, to emulate a similar well-established
body in aviation. On the basis of a detailed review of rele-
vant publications that examine patient safety in the context
of aviation practice, we have drawn up a table of compara-
tive features and a conceptual framework for patient safety.
Convergence and divergence of safety-related behaviours
across aviation and healthcare were derived and docu-
mented. Key safety-related domains that emerged included
Checklists, Training, Crew Resource Management, Sterile
Cockpit, Investigation and Reporting of Incidents and
Organisational Culture. We conclude that whilst healthcare
has much to learn from aviation in certain key domains, the
transfer of lessons from aviation to healthcare needs to be
nuanced, with the specific characteristics and needs of
healthcare borne in mind. On the basis of this review, it is
recommended that healthcare should emulate aviation in its
resourcing of staff who specialise in human factors and
related psychological aspects of patient safety and staff well-
being. Professional and post-qualification staff training could
specifically include Cognitive Bias Avoidance Training, as this
appears to play a key part in many errors relating to patient
safety and staff wellbeing.
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Comparisons have often been made between safety
management in aviation and healthcare.1,2 This
emulation is in the context of major achievements
in the ﬁeld of aviation – despite the number of
worldwide ﬂight hours doubling over the past
20 years (from approximately 25 million in 1993 to
54 million in 2013), the number of fatalities has
fallen from approximately 450 to 250 per year.3
This stands in comparison to healthcare, where in
the USA alone there are an estimated 200,000 pre-
ventable medical deaths every year, which amounts
to the equivalent of almost three fatal airline crashes
per day. As the renowned airline pilot Chesley
Sullenberger noted,4 if such a level of fatalities was
to happen in aviation, airlines would stop ﬂying,
airports would close, there would be congressional
hearings and there would be a presidential commis-
sion. No one would be allowed to ﬂy until the prob-
lem had been solved.
In this article, we present a comprehensive review
of similarities and diﬀerences between aviation and
healthcare and the application to healthcare of les-
sons learned in aviation.
Aviation versus healthcare: how
comparable?
Table 1 summarises how aviation compares with
healthcare. Some authors have expressed reservations
about the analogies between aviation and health-
care,5–9 and others have noted that industries such as
mining10 and metal manufacture11 may provide just as
valuable safety lessons as aviation. Amalberti et al.12
have pointed to some inbuilt features of healthcare
which may mean that it can never be as ultrasafe as
industries such as aviation. In contrast to aviation,
Reason13 has referred to the close personal contact
in healthcare and to the ‘lethal convergence of benevo-
lence’, which may result in the bypassing of protocols,
barriers and safeguards, often with patients’ best inter-
ests at heart.
Review framework
We provide a narrative review of the application of
aviation-based human factors interventions in health-
care. As our guiding framework, we have adapted the
models developed by Helmreich14 and by Lawton
et al.15 (Figure 1).
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Latent factors and organisational culture
At least three safety-related cultural attributes appear
to distinguish aviation from healthcare. Aviation has
much more of a blame-free culture in the case of
reporting and owning up to safety incidents; in
healthcare, there more often appear to be competing
demands between economic factors and safety, with
ﬁnancial pressures and considerations constantly
making news headlines; and safety permeates all
levels of the business of airlines, whereas in health-
care it is still regarded as the priority of some, not the
obligation of all. What is common to both industries
is the concept of professionalism, but paradoxically
this may sometimes lend itself to corners being cut
and social fragmentation between professional
groups.16
A safety culture toolkit developed in the UK after
railway accidents identiﬁed the following key features
– leadership, two-way communication, employee
involvement, learning culture and attitude towards
blame.17 It is widely accepted that along these dimen-
sions the organisational culture in aviation has chan-
ged dramatically over the past 30–40 years, but in
Table 1. Distinctive features of aviation and healthcare.
Domain AVIATION HEALTHCARE 
History • Hundred years • Hundreds of thousands of years 
Key Raw 
 Material 
• Aircra, usually less than 30 years old, 
serviced every few months 
• Human bodies, can live to around 100 years, check-up 
every 1-2 years or less frequently 
Acvies  • Pilots operate one or two types of aircra 
• Episode usually lasts 1-10 hours, with 
same crew on board 
• Health care professionals have to deal with a wide 
variety of equipment, diseases and presentaons  
• Duraon of inpaent stay may be days or even years, 
with numerous changeovers of staﬀ 
Equipment • There is a degree of standardisaon of 
displays across aircra 
• Most procedures are automated, with 
mulple back-up systems in place 
• Informaon such as weather condions is 
automacally available 
• There is relavely lile standardisaon of design across 
medical equipment 
• Automaon of procedures, and back-up systems, are 
somewhat variable, with much of healthcare being 
‘hands-on’ 
Service 
Users 
• Passengers are healthy 
• Passengers usually have lile knowledge 
of the crew or aircra or airline 
• Crew rarely know names of individual 
passengers, and the captain will seldom 
console a passenger personally if things go 
wrong 
• Paents are sick, vulnerable and injured  
• Paents will often come equipped with well-
researched informaon about their condion, their 
doctors and their hospital 
• Staﬀ will know each paent well and may also become 
familiar with their families. A  consultant will generally 
console a paent if things go wrong. 
Service 
Delivery 
• More homogenous  
• The same crew usually on board a ﬂight 
• Pilots do not become acquainted with 
passengers, or have to console them if 
anything goes wrong 
• Comfort and luxuries rather than safety 
can be correlated with ability to pay 
• There are few subspecialies of pilots and 
crew 
• More heterogeneous with a number of subspeciales 
involved 
• Health professionals get to know their paents and 
build up a rapport with them 
• Care is personal and paents are oen involved in 
treatment decisions 
• Quality of care can be related to the ability to pay, 
especially in developing countries 
• There are many subspecialies in healthcare 
Safeguards • Many safeguards are in place with a high 
degree of automazaon and 
computerised support  
• There are strictly enforceable rules to 
exclude adverse eﬀects of fague or 
alcohol on pilot’s performance 
• Limited safeguards, hands-on work, and a relave lack 
of automazaon and computerised support 
• Lack of strictly enforceable rules to exclude adverse 
eﬀects of fague. Rules about alcohol are seldom 
made explicit or strictly enforced. 
Safety • Equal for everyone on plane 
• Fatalies can be over 100 at a me, and 
usually include the crew of the plane 
• The seng of targets is relavely 
infrequent, and rarely conﬂicts with 
passenger safety 
• Can correlate with ability to pay, especially in 
developing countries 
• Fatalies generally involve one person. Staﬀ fatalies 
directly associated with paent care are very rare. 
• Targets may oen be present, and may on occasions 
conﬂict with paent safety 
Adverse   
Events 
• Major adverse events are always 
invesgated by a naonal body 
• Major adverse events are oen featured in 
the media 
• Pilot immunity is oen part of the 
reporng culture  
• Adverse event invesgaon reports are 
always published  
• Major adverse events are usually only invesgated 
locally, though may occasionally be subject to wider 
invesgaon  
• Major adverse events only occasionally feature in the 
media 
• Immunity is not necessarily part of the reporng 
culture, and disciplinary procedures are wide-ranging 
• Adverse event invesgaon reports are seldom 
published 
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healthcare organisations such as the NHS in the UK
there is still the feeling that hierarchies and fear of
speaking out persist and that the lack of accountabil-
ity for those who have transgressed, together with the
absence of any apology, perpetuates these cultural
limitations.18 Sullenberger19 has referred to an era in
aviation where pilots ‘acted like gods with a little ‘‘g’’
and cowboys with a capital ‘‘C’’’. Sadly, some of this
culture would still appear to remain in parts of health-
care. As Timmons et al.20 have argued, full and suc-
cessful implementation of human factors initiatives
may be stalled if the culture in an organisation is
not accommodating. They found that a six-day
human factors training course taken by emergency
and perioperative staﬀ appeared to be valued and con-
sidered helpful by staﬀ who took part, but that imple-
mentation of behavioural changes on the ground was
stalled by long-standing cultural and organisational
issues. Sullenberger4 has powerfully argued for
patient safety to be embedded in board and ﬁnancial
decision making in healthcare – and noted,
Safety should be part and parcel of everything we
do . . .Every decision that is made, whether it’s
administrative, budgetary, or otherwise, should take
safety implications into account because there is such
an important business case for doing so . . .What we
have right now, quite frankly, in healthcare are
islands – visible islands of excellence in a sea of invis-
ible failures, with risk lurking just below the water-
line. We need to widen those islands of excellence.
We need to connect these islands with more dry land.
We need to address these areas of risk. That is going
to require transparency, it’s going to require data, it’s
going to require personal story telling, and it’s going
to require eﬀective use of health IT.
Implicit in healthcare comparisons with other
safety-critical industries is the message that staﬀ well-
being, morale and motivation are key to the safe,
successful and proﬁtable delivery of a service and of
a supportive organisational culture. As Paul O’Neill,
former US Treasury Secretary and CEO of the metal
company Alcoa, stated, ‘I don’t think you can be
habitually excellent at everything unless you begin
with caring about your workers’.11 Staﬀ may suﬀer
distress and ill-health for a variety of reasons, ranging
Figure 1. This Figure provides a framework for the approach offered in this paper. It is adapted from the models described by
Helmreich14 and by Lawton et al.15 We distinguish between background ‘Latent’ factors and more current, situational ‘Active’
factors. Active failures include lapses, mistakes and violations. We also allow for an analysis of adverse events, but we adopt the
more neutral term ‘Performance Analysis’ to allow for the analysis of high levels of excellence, so that lessons can be learned from
such ‘positive’ behaviours as well as from ‘negative’ behaviours, which have traditionally been the primary focus of investigations.
Kapur et al. 3
from distress following major complications of a
treatment they have carried out21 to suicide in the
context of undergoing investigations by a regulatory
body.22 The Francis Report into whistleblowing in
the NHS18 referred to many cases of whisteblowers
and others being badly treated, and sometimes being
subject to ‘kangaroo courts’ by NHS management,
with no allowance for Plurality, Independence and
Expertise principles to ensure fairness. Invariably,
such cases may not only impinge on patient safety
and staﬀ wellbeing but may also involve signiﬁcant
expenditure from public funds coupled with ﬁnancial
hardship to staﬀ who have to pay for their own legal
costs. Legal settings, such as employment tribunals,
are not interested in the implications of such cases for
patient safety and staﬀ wellbeing, and may sometimes
be seen as weighted in favour of NHS employers, who
have ﬁnancial resources to maximise a legal case, to
take an unfavourable ruling to a higher court, etc. In
recent years, in the UK health service there have been
prominent cases of NHS staﬀ who have suﬀered as a
result of extreme stress – including Eva Clark, the
nurse at Mid-Staﬀordshire hospital, who committed
suicide after being bullied at work23 and Jacintha
Saldanha, who committed suicide in December 2012
after suﬀering the humiliation of mistakenly answer-
ing a hoax phone call, pretending to be from the
Queen, to the ward where the Duchess of
Cambridge was a patient.24 In both of these cases,
the level of support that should have been provided
to staﬀ was apparently absent.
The Public Administration Select Committee of
the UK House of Commons recommended25 that
the government adopt the proposal set out by
Macrae and Vincent26 for an independent Patient
Safety Investigation Agency and this recommenda-
tion has been accepted by the government.
When adverse events in healthcare seriously aﬀect
staﬀ wellbeing, morale and motivation – regardless
of whether the origins are poor patient outcome,
poor management, etc. – such events need to be
given the same urgency as when patients suﬀer. In
line with the above message propounded by Paul
O’Neill, it is worth considering whether, in addition
to an Independent Patient Safety Investigation
Service, a parallel body is put in place, an
Independent Staﬀ Investigation and Support
Service, so that lessons can be learned when health-
care staﬀ suﬀer in major ways in the clinical work-
place, and so that staﬀ support mechanisms can be
readily put in place.27 The current UK Health
Secretary is quoted as stating in June 2015, ‘The
performance of the NHS is only as good as the sup-
port we give to the staﬀ’ (https://abetternhs.word
press.com/2015/06/10/supervision/), and this
needs to be translated into practical changes on the
ground.
Active factors
Checklists. The need for checklists is based on the prem-
ise that in the execution of procedures the human brain
may be subject to three key cognitive limitations: we
may forget to retrieve one of a number of steps in a
procedure; we may retrieve a step but for one reason
or another (e.g. distraction, fatigue) may not remember
to carry it out; or wemay retrieve the step, remember to
carry it out, but execute the action incorrectly. In avi-
ation, there is usuallymuchmore in terms of procedural
documentation of immediate relevance, such as in
Airline Operations Manuals or Quick Reference
Handbooks, and Toﬀ28 has proposed the availability
of similar systems in healthcare. In aviation, there
appear to be three forms of checklists, one for simple,
routine operations; one for more complex operations;
and one for emergency procedures (where the checklist
may be ‘do-verify later’ rather than ‘read-verify’).
Checklists also vary between types of aircraft.
Checklists have traditionally been a more integral
part of aviation workﬂow, whereas in medical discip-
lines such as surgery, they have been a more recent
innovation. To this extent, they may be seen to
represent a form of ‘time out’ during an established
routine. Medical applications of checklists have
included the ﬁelds of surgery and infection control,29–31
and there have also been attempts to reap the beneﬁts of
checklists to help avoid errors in medical diagnosis.32,33
Catchpole et al.34 used both aviation and Formula
1 pit-stop expertise to inform the use of checklists to
ensure smooth handover between surgery and inten-
sive care. Low et al.35 focused on the application of
checklists on key transition points in surgery, ‘ﬂow
checklists’, so as to ensure that high-risk points such
as departure from operating room do not suﬀer from
lapses in procedures being executed. Wadhera et al.36
showed how such an approach, if applied to key
stages of cardiovascular surgery with high cognitive
demands, can yield beneﬁts. In a similar vein,
Federwisch et al.37 incorporated staﬀ shift change-
over times with a form of checklist by incoming
and outgoing nurses to note items such as identiﬁca-
tion bracelet and IV catheter sites. Schelkun38
extended the checklist concept to implementing a
form of aviation plan in surgical settings – plan the
operation taking into account the patient, the injury/
illness, and the goals of the operation; decide on
details of the operation, noting surgical approach,
equipment needed, etc.; put together a surgical equip-
ment checklist; and ensure good communication at
every stage of the procedure, including debrieﬁng
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afterwards to review what went well and what could
have been improved. On the more cautious side,
Clay-Williams and Colligan39 argued that there is
variable evidence on the eﬃcacy of checklists in
healthcare, that checklists may not be applicable in
more complex clinical settings (cf.6), and that over-
reliance on checklists may detract from other forms
of safety. In a similar vein, Catchpole and Russ40
argued that a checklist is a ‘complex socio-technical
intervention that requires attention to design, imple-
mentation and basic skills required for the task’, and
that checklists may succeed and fail in healthcare for
a variety of reasons.
Training. Training in aviation and training in ﬁelds such
as surgery have been compared, with aviation training
and competency assessment generally considered to be
more rigorous and more regimented.41–43 Initial pilot
training normally takes around three years, and becom-
ing a captainwill usually take around a further 10 years.
Training to become a doctor usually takes around ﬁve
years, with generally a further 10 years before becoming
a consultant. Keeping up with the explosion of know-
ledge in healthcare is daunting but necessary, even for
experienced consultants, but this is not somuch the case
in aviation. Pilot training is in a variety of settings, on
the ground, in an aircraft and always in a simulator.
Simulation has also been extended to teamwork and
debrieﬁng. Simulators are overall less used in medical
training – or they are used less systematically. Pilots
have to undergo proﬁciency checks, usually in a simu-
lator, every six months. Doctors in the UK now
undergo re-validation every ﬁve years. Pilot training is
broken down into core competency skills, and this form
of behavioural analysis of the skill training needs is
becoming more common in healthcare. Non-technical
skills, such as leadership, team working, decision
making, situational awareness, managing stress and
coping with fatigue, are extensively taught in pilot
training, with well-established protocols for behav-
ioural measurements of crew while in ﬂight.44 It is
only in recent years that behavioural marker systems
that capture the non-technical skills of healthcare pro-
fessionals have been developed in medicine, with some
areas such as anaesthesia and surgery particularly
embracing their value.28,45–47 When unexpected or
emergency situations arise, both doctors and pilots
will beneﬁt from a commitment to life-long learning,
a good understanding of disasters and how to deal
with them and an ability to think ﬂexibly.48,49 What is
more, the personality of the pilot has been considered as
part of determining risk-proﬁles during training, but as
yet this has not happened in medicine.50 In surgery,
Lewis et al.51 have argued that there may persist
macho and ‘heroism’ personalities in surgeons, where
improvising or ﬁnding a solution over-rides seeking or
heeding advice from others in a team.
Crew resource management and sterile cockpit. Crew
resource management essentially refers to how mem-
bers of a team interact and are aware of factors that
inﬂuence performance. Seager et al.52 noted ﬁve fea-
tures of crew resource management – cooperation,
leadership, workload management, situational aware-
ness and decision making. The ‘team’ in aviation may
primarily be just the pilot and co-pilot, with a degree
of hierarchy between the two, whereas the team in
surgery or other medical settings may be more
diverse, with more distinct roles and with a variable
degree of hierarchy. Communication failures may be
more likely to occur in healthcare than in aviation
cockpit settings for a variety of reasons, including
the wide range of staﬀ and distractions/interruptions
that are prevalent in many clinical interactions. In
healthcare, there is probably a wider range of infor-
mation, with the reliability and dynamic nature of
such information diﬀering from that in aviation. In
addition, the eﬀects of introducing aviation-style
teamwork training into medicine may vary according
to the speciality,53 and may be determined in part by
organisational and attitudinal factors.54 Although
there are usually clear diﬀerences in knowledge,
skills and experience between a pilot and co-pilot,
safety in aviation is encouraged to take priority
over deference, with simple measures such as the
use of ﬁrst names in interactions.51 This is not
common practice in healthcare, since it is inherently
hierarchical, with resultant barriers to assertiveness.55
As Ornato and Peberdy56 argued, some healthcare
settings may well beneﬁt from the implementation
of aviation procedures such as cross-checks, read-
back and ‘two challenge rule’ (another team
member is allowed to over-ride someone if that
person has been challenged twice but has failed to
respond appropriately). Seager et al.52 have noted
features of crew resource management which could
be readily applied to healthcare settings such as the
operating theatre, and these include peer monitoring,
brieﬁngs, deﬁning operating procedures and stand-
ards, recognition of fatigue as a factor in perform-
ance, regular ‘check rides’ in the form of assessment
in a simulator, blame-free reporting culture, use of
checklists and application of the principle of a ‘sterile
cockpit’. Brieﬁngs before and after surgery may be
particularly helpful in both encouraging members in
the team to stand back and appraise procedures, and
also to encourage mutual respect and team bonding
between the members.57–59 Good communication
within crew resource management involves respect
for each other’s roles, and also simple measures
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such as direct eye contact, introducing each other,
using non-judgemental words and putting safety
before self-esteem.
A ‘sterile cockpit’, which essentially refers to an
environment free of unnecessary distractions, may
improve patient safety if applied at key points in
clinical procedures.36 A distraction-free environ-
ment is especially important when a critical or com-
plex procedure is being carried out, whether it be
an intricate stage of a surgical procedure in health-
care or taking oﬀ/landing in aviation. There is a
high frequency of distractions and interruptions in
the work of healthcare professionals,60 with a nega-
tive impact on patient safety.61,62 A number of stu-
dies, such as that by Federwisch et al.,37 have
successfully applied the sterile cockpit idea to
medication delivery, where ‘DO NOT DISTURB’
tabards or signs are visible during medication
rounds, so as to reduce the number of distractions.
When emergencies arise in a cockpit or in a surgi-
cal setting, multiple alarms may be activated, and
the ability to notice and respond to key alarms,
and to think ﬂexibly, are key for safe outcomes –
analogies can readily be made here between airline
and medical settings.49,63–65
Performance analysis
Investigation of incidents. In the UK, an investigation
report by the Air Accidents Investigation Board
can involve at least several months of work, with
ﬁeld investigations where appropriate, and detailed
background information sought on the equipment
and individuals involved. The usual structure of
an Air Accidents Investigation Board Report is as
follows:
(a) There is ﬁrstly a factual summary of the key fea-
tures of the incident which includes detailed
information about the aircraft and the pilot.
(b) There follows a synopsis of the report:
. An exposition of all the relevant facts of the inci-
dent, often with graphs and photographs
. An analysis of the data gathered with a view to
understanding what could have contributed to
the incident
. Conclusions and safety recommendations
Woloshynowych et al.66 have documented the
types of investigations and analyses that are carried
out for critical incidents and adverse events in health-
care, and studied 138 papers that provided relevant
evidence. They cited systems such as the Australian
Incident Monitoring System, the Critical Incident
Technique, Signiﬁcant Event Auditing, Root Cause
Analysis, the Organizational Accident Causation
Model and the Comparison with Standards
approach. They concluded that:
There was little or no information on the training of
investigators, how the data was extracted or any
information on quality assurance for data collection
and analysis . . . In most papers, there was little or no
discussion of implementation of any changes as a
result of the investigations. (p. iii)
Macrae and Vincent26 have pointed to major
limitations in the quality of investigations and moni-
toring of the implementation of recommendations for
improvement in the case of healthcare compared with
other industries such aviation. They have argued for
an independent investigations agency in the NHS,
comparable to the Air Accidents Investigation
Board, and to its parallel body in the USA, the
National Transportation Safety Board, a recommen-
dation that has been accepted by the UK govern-
ment. In the USA, a speciﬁc aviation safety body
was set up in 1998 to bring together stakeholders in
government and industry, and was called the
Commercial Aviation Safety Team. This team identi-
ﬁes top safety areas through analysis of accident and
incident data; it charters joint teams of experts to
develop methods to fully understand the chain of
events leading to accidents; and it identiﬁes and
implements high-leverage safety interventions to
reduce the fatality rate in these areas. Pronovost
et al.67 argued for a similar body to be set up
within healthcare.
Reporting of incidents. Reporting of incidents has
many dimensions, which include the extent to which
reporting is blame-free; the readiness to produce a
report; the documentation of near-misses; the par-
ticular reports which are investigated; the format,
investigation and dissemination of reports; the body
that investigates and reports on serious incidents;
positive or negative consequences for those who
have contributed to or highlighted an adverse event;
and the resulting action plans. In healthcare,
Morbidity & Mortality meetings, where they
happen, are often a forum where problematic cases
are reported and discussed, and where deaths and
serious complications ought to be reviewed to
promote learning and improvements in practice. In
terms of national reporting, in the UK there is
the National Reporting and Learning Service, which
is one of the largest reporting systems of its type in
the world. A key criticism of reporting within health-
care is that the link from error to learning has often
not materialised, and few mechanisms are put in
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place to ensure that changes have been implemented
and errors are not repeated. In aviation, a major inci-
dent is often followed by the causes being simulated
and becoming part of training, and particular equip-
ment design, procedural or training recommenda-
tions being put in place, such as happened after the
2009 Air France plane disaster.68
In clinical practice, adverse events such as compli-
cations are often considered to be routine, and thus
may not be reported. Apart from blame, some doc-
tors may not report near-miss adverse events due to a
sense of pride or self-esteem, or due to fear of litiga-
tion. There may also be lack of time for reporting and
high workload, lack of understanding why reporting
is needed, concerns that no beneﬁcial action will
follow and in some countries lack of conﬁdentiality
or absence of adequate reporting systems in
place.69,70 As has been found in aviation,71 near-
misses may often be as instructive as adverse
events.72 It may be worth translating into healthcare
the aviation system of immunity from disciplinary
action for the reporting of adverse incidents, apart
from cases of gross or wilful negligence.73 The
system used in aviation, Conﬁdential Human
Factors Incident Reporting Programme, has now
been emulated in the ﬁeld of surgery – Conﬁdential
Reporting System in Surgery – and has been found to
work well.74 Similar schemes, which also encourage
the reporting of near-misses, have adopted user-
friendly online reporting formats.75
Ferroli et al.76 described how, with the support of
aviation specialists, they designed a Patient Incident
Reporting System form which was used to record
near-misses in a neurosurgical setting. They analysed
14 such incidents and were able to distinguish diﬀer-
ent types of failures – human factors (the most
common), technological factors, organisational
factors and procedural factors. Their reporting and
analysis system appeared to encourage a no-blame
reporting culture. Clinicians rarely keep an audio or
video record of their interactions with patients,
and the introduction of such recordings is a matter of
debate.77 However, in aviation, ‘black boxes’ – which
record ﬂight data and cockpit conversations – are
carried in all commercial aircraft. The idea of docu-
menting all safety failures, however minor, was also
highlighted by Bowermaster et al.,78 who likened
their approach to that of using the ‘black box’ prin-
ciple in aviation (cf.79). Helmreich14 has described a
‘Line Operations Safety Audit’ that involved expert
observers in the cockpit during normal ﬂights. As
well as potential safety threats, such as mountains
and adverse weather, types of human error were
documented, and fell into several groups – violations
(e.g. conscious failure to adhere to procedures),
procedural errors (e.g. erroneous entry into ﬂight
computer), errors in communication (e.g. misunder-
stood altitude clearance), lack of proﬁciency (e.g.
inability to program computer-based device), and
poor decisions (e.g. decision to navigate through
adverse weather). There is scope for emulating avi-
ation by including direct observation of clinical staﬀ
as part of routinely evaluating quality of care.80
Implications for healthcare
There are many opportunities for safety measures and
concepts in high-risk industries such as aviation to be
considered for adoption in healthcare, with a need for
actions to be proactive and generative, rather than
solely reactive to adverse events.81 A focus on systems
rather than individuals, and an examination of ‘latent
risk factors’ that may result in adverse events, are
other lessons that we can learn from aviation.82,83
Naturally, adopting measures from aviation without
adapting them for the unique healthcare environment
would be unwise, but where this has been done in a
systematic but ﬂexible way, clear beneﬁts have been
found.84 Issues such as privacy and patient conﬁden-
tiality are particularly important in healthcare. In the
ﬁnance-driven world of healthcare, any safety
improvements should ideally have a good economic
argument to accompany them, but – as Lewis et al.51
have argued – making such a case should be relatively
easy to do, especially bearing in mind the huge litiga-
tion costs of clinical negligence claims.
As happens in safety-critical industries such as
aviation, human factors training and related psycho-
logical training in patient safety and staﬀ wellbeing
need to be an integral part of all NHS staﬀ work-
plans, from the board-room to the bedside, with
dedicated human factors/patient safety psychologists
in post. Most major airlines have well-established
departments that are staﬀed by a large team of psych-
ologists/human factors specialists, while this is the
exception rather than the rule for major NHS hos-
pitals. The psychology of patient safety and staﬀ well-
being should be an integral part of the professional
training curricula of healthcare staﬀ, staﬀ selection,
induction, appraisal, revalidation, merit awards and
Continuing Professional Development, so as to grad-
ually develop the appreciation within the healthcare
community of the impact of human factors, psycho-
logical variables and non-technical skills on safety.
Cognitive Bias Avoidance Training could form a
key component of such training curricula in view of
the key part cognitive decision making plays in a
number of adverse incidents,85 and the potential
eﬀectiveness of Cognitive Bias Avoidance Training
for reducing diagnostic errors.86,87 Key bodies, such
Kapur et al. 7
as NHS England, the Care Quality Commission and
the Department of Health, as well as regulatory
bodies such as the General Medical Council, should
have resident expertise in human factors and the
psychology of safety, together with an ethos that
embraces and rewards clinical excellence (cf.88–90).
In a recent television interview, Captain Chesley
Sullenberger, the senior crew member of the
Hudson River aircraft incident, is reported as stating,
We have purchased at great cost lessons literally
bought with blood that we have to preserve as insti-
tutional knowledge and pass on to succeeding gener-
ations. We cannot have the moral failure of
forgetting those lessons and have to relearn them.
It behoves all of those involved in healthcare deliv-
ery to have this same urgency of purpose.
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